

PINDAR I. 1.67–68

67 εἰ δέ τις ἔνδον νέμει πλοῦτον κροφαῖον,
68 ἄλλοισι δ' ἐμπίπτων γελᾷ, ψυχὰν Ἀίδα τελέων
οὐ φράζεται δόξας ἀνευθεν¹).

During the past decades, the First Isthmian has attracted particular attention among Pindar's odes²), but its ending continues to perplex interpreters³). There is general agreement that this depiction of a miser foolishly unconcerned with posthumous renown is intended to provide a negative foil heightening by contrast the praise of the victorious Herodotus; and the specific link between these lines and an earlier passage in which athletic endeavor was favorably contrasted with the naked daily effort to ward off hunger (40–51) has been recognized⁴). But what exactly the miser is supposed to be doing when he ἄλλοισι ἐμπίπτων γελᾷ is far from clear.

Until recently, the *communis opinio* was that the miser is insulting and deriding people who differ from him – whether because they are poor⁵) or because they are extravagant⁶) is of small

1) Cited, here and hereafter, from B. Snell and H. Maehler, ed., *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis*. I: *Epinicia*⁵ (Leipzig 1971).

2) See especially B. A. van Groningen, *La composition littéraire archaïque grecque. Procédés et réalisations* (Amsterdam 1958) = *Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde*. N.R. 65.2, 375–85; E. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica II: The First Isthmian Ode* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962) = *University of California Publications in Classical Philology* 18.2.35–92; E. Thummer, ed., *Pindar: Die Isthmischen Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968), 1.160–65 and 2.7–35; and G. A. Privitera, *Lettura della prima Istmica di Pindaro*, *QUCC* 28 (1978) 97–134, and *Pindaro, Le Istmiche* ([Milan] 1982, 9–25 and 139–55. Cf. also my *The Measures of Praise. Structure and Function in Pindar's Second Pythian and Seventh Nemean Odes* (Göttingen 1985), Ch. 1.

3) So most recently Privitera, *Lettura* (op. cit. [n. 2], 131 n. 56: “Dubbio il senso...”) and *Istmiche* (op. cit. [n. 2], 155: “significato dubbio”).

4) Cf. Thummer, op. cit. (n. 2), 2.35; Privitera, *Istmiche*, op. cit. (n. 2), 154–55; and my op. cit. (n. 2).

5) So Schmid *apud* L. Dissen in A. Boeckh, ed., *Pindari Epinicionum interpretatio Latina cum commentario perpetuo* = *Pindari Opera quae supersunt. Tomi secundi pars altera* (Leipzig 1821 = Hildesheim 1963), 490; followed e.g. by W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969), s. v. ἄλλος B. 1.

6) So the scholia ad I. 1.96a (cited, here and hereafter, from A. B. Drach-

import. This interpretation was arrived at either by taking ἐμπίπτων to denote verbal abuse⁷), or by taking γελᾶ to refer to mocking, scornful laughter⁸), or both⁹). For those who sought covert historical references throughout Pindar's poems, the miser, so understood, could easily be seen as an allusion to real critics of Herodotus' athletic endeavors and expenses among the victor's fellow-citizens¹⁰).

This supposed historical reference was sharply, and justifiably, criticized by Bundy¹¹), and finds few supporters nowadays. But the distortions of the Greek language which the traditional interpretation of the sentence entails have proven harder to avoid. For all the evidence shows that ἐμπίπτω with a personal subject and a personal object can only mean to attack someone physically in the serious attempt to inflict violent harm upon him¹²), and that

mann, ed., *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina* [Leipzig 1903–27]); followed e.g. by Dissen in Boeckh, loc. cit. (n. 5); J. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Leipzig 1883), s.v. ἄλλος I.1; J. B. Bury, *The Isthmian Odes of Pindar* (London 1892), 25; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros*² (Berlin–Zürich–Dublin 1966), 333.

7) So Dissen, loc. cit. ([n. 5] “Qui aliter sentientes calumnians verbisque invidiosis laedens ridet...”), and *Pindari carmina quae supersunt cum deperditorum fragmentis selectis ex recensione Boeckhii* (Gotha and Erfurt 1830), 2.534 (“aliis autem aliter sentientibus insultans ridet, sibi placet insultans”), followed e.g. by Rumpel, op. cit. (n. 6), s.v. ἄλλος, γελᾶω, ἐμπίπτω; J. Sandys, ed., *The Odes of Pindar. Including the Principal Fragments*³ (Cambridge, Mass.–London 1968), 445 (“and rejoiceth in oppressing others”); and Slater, op. cit. (n. 5), s.v. ἐμπίπτω c (“attack [with words]”).

8) So Bury, loc. cit. ([n. 6] “...and laughs when he lights on men of another sort... When the hoarder falls in with ‘other men’ [far other indeed than he] he laughs at the thought of their folly and his own superior wisdom”), followed by L. R. Farnell, ed., *The Works of Pindar* (London 1930), 2.341; and O. Werner, ed., *Pindar: Siegesgesänge und Fragmente* (Munich [1967]), 299 (“Und trifft er andre, lacht...”).

9) So the scholia ad loc. (ἐπεμβαίνων καταγελᾶ), followed e.g. by F. Mezger, *Pindars Siegeslieder* (Leipzig 1880), 311 (“wer über andere...herfallend sie [als Thoren] verlacht”), and A. Puech, ed., *Pindare. 4: Isthmiques et Fragments*² (Paris 1952), 23 (“et ne sait que rire des autres et les insulter...”).

10) So especially Dissen, loc. cit. (n. 5); Mezger, op. cit. (n. 9), 307, 311; Bury, op. cit. (n. 6), 6–7; Wilamowitz, loc. cit. (n. 6); and Farnell, loc. cit. (n. 8).

11) Bundy, op. cit. (n. 2), 84–85.

12) So in Pindar (a wrestler, P. 8.81; Achilles, N. 6.51); and cf. Homer *Il.* 16.81, 276; *Od.* 24.526; Aesch. *Ag.* 1468; *Eur. Rh.* 127, 409; *Xen. Hipparch.* 8.25, *Cyn.* 6.23; *Cass. Dio.* 8.13.3; and cf. the closely related *Eur. Phoen.* 1146, 1154 (πύλαιον). In Polybius 1.21.11, ἐμπίπτειν τοῖς πολεμίοις is usually taken to mean simply “ran into the enemy”: yet clearly an attack is described, even if an unplanned one, and its losses are enumerated. This general point is made by Bury, loc. cit. (n. 6), followed by Farnell, loc. cit. (n. 8); by Thummer, op. cit. (n. 2), 34; and by Privitera, *Istmiche* op. cit. (n. 2), 155.

γελᾶω with a personal dative object can only mean to smile benevolently upon someone¹³). If, as seems natural, both ἐμπίπτων and γελᾶ refer, by ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, to ἄλλοισι, we must seemingly understand the miser to be smiling kindly upon the same people he is attempting violently to injure; and even if we separate γελᾶ from ἄλλοισι, we find him smiling kindly while he physically assaults people. The image is so patently absurd in itself and so alien to the context that it is hardly surprising that most scholars, in order to avoid it, have preferred to posit unattested and anomalous meanings for two of the three words in this phrase, nor that so many other scholars have felt obliged to emend the text to bring its language into better agreement with their conception¹⁴).

There have apparently been only four attempts to reconsider this passage radically without resorting to such surgery; none has been successful.

(1) Norwood suggests that “we should take ἄλλοισι as governed by γελᾶ and with ἐμπίπτων understand πλοῦτῳ from πλοῦτον in the preceding verse: the miser *defosso incubat auro*. An excellent sense thus emerges: ‘he hoards his wealth secreted at home and laughs at others while he embraces it’¹⁵”. Unfortunately, this sense must be purchased at the cost of a thoroughly implausible word-order¹⁶): only as a very last resort might we be inclined to divorce ἄλλοισι from the immediately neighboring ἐμπίπτων, a word which can easily govern the dative.

(2) Bundy takes the image to refer to “the mockery [scil. by the rich] of those in evil circumstances”¹⁷): “Herodotos may not and will not keep his wealth to himself, taking pleasure in the lot of others less fortunate than himself, but will labor and spend to achieve a fame on men’s lips that will live after him”¹⁸). But this interpretation entirely ignores ἐμπίπτων¹⁹), and, as we have seen, there is no evidence that γελᾶω with the *dativus personae* can mean to mock.

13) Cf. Hes. Op. 371; Philemon 110 Kock; Coll. Alex. p. 83 col. 3 line 1 Powell; for other constructions with a personal object, cf. notes 28–30 below. This point is made by Privitera, *Istmiche*, op. cit. (n. 2), 155.

14) The various conjectures are conveniently collected in Douglas E. Gerber, *Emendations in Pindar 1513–1972* (Amsterdam 1976), 130.

15) G. Norwood, *Two Notes on Pindar, Isthmian I and VII*, *AJPh* 63 (1942) 460–61, here 460.

16) So too Thummer, op. cit. (n. 2), 35.

17) Bundy, op. cit. (n. 2), 88.

18) *Ibid.* 90.

19) So too Thummer, loc. cit.

(3) Thummer paraphrases, “Wer im Kampfe mit anderen lacht, d.h. wer nicht ernsthaft kämpft, der wird es nie zu großem Ruhme bringen”²⁰). But it is surely misguided to identify the miser himself as an athlete, even if only as a jovial one: the fact that the miser keeps all his wealth hidden indoors (67) ought to mean that he does not engage at all in expensive public activities such as athletic competition; if not only Herodotus, but also the miser is an athlete, the contrast in these closing lines becomes blurred. Furthermore, ἄλλοιοι is on this interpretation pointless: surely a less colorless word could have been found to denote the jovial miserly athlete’s rivals. And is there any evidence that the ancients would have condemned a smiling athlete as unserious?

(4) Finally, Privitera tentatively suggests that ἄλλοιοι refers to other activities favored by the miser but indicated by ἐμπίπτων as being inferior to Herodotus’ athletic endeavors; he translates, “e ad altro sorride e si dedica”²¹), and paraphrases, “l’avaro tiene la ricchezza in casa e guarda con simpatia ad altre attività – diverse da quelle coltivate da Erodoto, che comportano spese e fatiche – alle quali si dedica senza riflettere che sono inferiori”²²). But there is no evidence that ἐμπίπτω ever has the meaning of dedicating oneself to some activity, nor that, despite its root notion of falling, the Greeks ever used it as equivalent to our “descend to, stoop to”. And it seems quite implausible in the immediate context that ἄλλοιοι might mean, not “other than the miser”, but instead “other than Herodotus”.

Obviously, Pindar has chosen (or been compelled by the proximity of the ode’s end) to express himself so compactly and elliptically that, once his exact meaning has been problematized sufficiently, it is conceivable that no consensus about it might ever again be reached. If, nevertheless, a new suggestion is offered here, it is because there remains at least one, hitherto apparently unproposed, interpretation, which has the merit of being based upon well-attested meanings of each of the words in this passage.

It seems that the source of the interpreters’ difficulties lies in the physical violence ineluctably denoted by ἐμπίπτων in this construction: neither attempting to minimize or rationalize that violence entailed by ἐμπίπτων nor attempting to reconstrue it as arising from γελᾶ has proven to be a successful strategy for dealing

20) Ibid.

21) Privitera, *Istmiche*, op. cit. (n. 2), 25.

22) Ibid., 155.

with this sentence. In fact, it is not at all necessary for Pindar's logic that the miser assault or mock anyone, physically or verbally, or indeed that he perform any other action with regard to other people: he need only believe that his hidden wealth is enough to keep him out of harm's way for Pindar to be able to make the point that against the greatest harms, death and the possible lack of posthumous fame, it offers no protection. We will not be able to get such a meaning out of ἐπιπτώων as the interpreters have construed it: but is this the only way to understand the word in this passage?

ἐπιπτώω, as noted above, always denotes a violent physical assault when used with a personal subject and a *dativus personae*. But it also occurs with a personal subject and a *dativus rei* in the meaning "to encounter, to be exposed to [especially a misfortune]". Pindar himself provides one parallel in an athletic metaphor, αἴθωνι πρὶν ἄλιῳ γυῖον ἐμπεσεῖν (N. 7.73)²³; another is provided by Polybius, Πριηνεῖς ἐνέπεσον παραλόγῳ συμφορᾷ (33.6.1). Such phrases can be understood as a variant of the very common usage of ἐπιπτώω with a personal subject and a prepositional phrase (usually εἰς²⁴, sometimes ἐπί²⁵ or ἐν²⁶) to mean "to fall into, to encounter [usually some misfortune]".

To understand ἐπιπτώων in this way requires that we recognize in ἄλλοισι not the masculine, but the neuter dative plural²⁷). If we turn back to the other problematic verb in this passage, we recall that γελάω with a *dativus personae* means "to smile benevo-

23) Cf. Slater, *op. cit.* (n. 5), s.v. ἐπιπίνω c ("light upon, i.e. be exposed to").

24) Soph. El. 215 (ἄτας); Antiphon 1.20 (νόσον), 2.2.3 (ὑποψίας); Plato Theaet. 174C (φρέατά τε καὶ πάσαν ἀπορίαν); Xen. Hell. 7.5.6 (ἄθυμίαν), Mem. 3.12.2 (τὰς ἀνάγκας τὰς ἀλγεινοτάτας); Antiphanes 235.3 Kock (ἔρωτα); Menander Aspis 401–2 (τοσοῦτον . . . πάθος), Samia 220 (τοιαύτην . . . ταραχὴν).

25) Hdt. 7.88 (συμφορὴν).

26) Plato Hipp. maj. 298C (τῇ αὐτῇ . . . ἀπορίᾳ), Euthyd. 292E (ταύτη τῇ ἀπορίᾳ).

27) As far as I know, this has only been suggested twice: by Tyrrell *apud* Bury, *loc. cit.* ("Mr. Tyrrell suggests that ἄλλοισιν might be taken as neuter, κτήμασι being supplied from πλοῦτον; then the meaning would be 'as he pounces on more'; cf. ὅς ἐν κτήμασι πίπτεις, Soph. Ant. 782"), and by Privitera, *loc. cit.* (n. 21). But the former suggestion is rendered implausible (1) by the difficulty of supplying the required κτήμασι and (2) by the fact that the resulting meaning would have to be the nonsensical "as he attacks more" (the Sophocles passage means "who makes havoc of wealth," cf. R. Jebb, *Sophocles. The Plays and Fragments. III: The Antigone*³ [Amsterdam 1962], ad *loc.*). The latter suggestion is criticized above.

lently upon someone”; whenever the verb means “to laugh at, ridicule someone” it always takes either ἐπί with a *dativus personae*²⁸, or (rarely) εἰς²⁹ or an *accusativus personae*³⁰). But there are a number of parallels for γελάω with a *dativus rei* in the meaning “to laugh at, take lightly [usually misfortunes]”³¹:

Soph. Aj. 956–57: γελᾶ δὲ τοῖσι μαινομένοις ἄχρουν / πολὺν γέλωτα.

961–62: οἱ δ’ οὖν γελώντων κάπιχαιρόντων κακοῖς / τοῖς τοῦδε[ε].

1042–43: κακοῖς / γελῶν.

Eur. Tr. 406: ὡς ἡδέως κακοῖσιν οἰκείοις γελάς.

IT 276: ἐγέλασεν εὐχαῖς.

Aristoph. Nub. 560: ὅστις οὖν τούτοισι γελᾶ, τοῖς ἑμοῖς μὴ χαιρέτω.

Eq. 696: ἐγέλασα ψολοκομπταῖς.

Epicurus Frg. 600 Usener (= Plut. Mor. 1088B): γελᾶν φησι ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματος πολ- λάκις κάμνοντα τὸν σοφόν.

Plut. Mor. 169D: τὸν ἄθεον γελῶντα μὲν μανικὸν καὶ Σαρδά- νιον γέλωτα τοῖς ποιουμένοις.

Both ἐμπίπτων and γελᾶ will be able to have meanings entirely appropriate to this context if we succeed in identifying ἄλλοισι as a neuter plural denoting misfortunes. But can ἄλλος mean not only “other”, but also “other than what is good or expected, i.e. bad”? The euphemistic usage of ἕτερος is fairly common³² – Pindar himself provides two examples (P. 3.34, N. 8.3)³³ – and the fact, recognized by both ancient and modern scholars³⁴, that ἄλλος is

28) Homer, Il. 2.270; 23.784; Od. 20.358, 374; 21.376; Xen. Oecon. 2.9, Symp. 2.17, 23.

29) Soph. Aj. 79.

30) Theocr. 20.1, 15 (cf. A. S. F. Gow, ed., Theocritus [Cambridge 1965], 2.365 ad loc.).

31) There is also at least one passage in which ἐμπίπτω, with this meaning, takes ἐπί: Soph. El. 879–80.

32) Cf. LSJ s.v. ἕτερος III.2, V.3.

33) Cf. Rumpel, op. cit. (n. 6), s.v. ἕτερος; Slater, op. cit. (n. 5), s.v. ἕτερος c (“as euphemism, bad”). The Schol. ad P. 3.62a gloss δαίμων δ’ ἕτερος as ὁ κακοποιός, ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἀγαθόν.

34) Schol. A ad Il. 1.120, and cf. Schol. A and T ad Il. 9.313, Schol. A ad Il. 9.473; Eustath. 1573.48 ff. ad Od. 7.124; Casaubon on Strabo 1.2.5 (cited from Strabonis Rerum Geographicarum libri XVII [Amsterdam 1707], 1.33); Gow on Theocr. 7.36 (op. cit. [n. 30], 2.140); and *idem* and D. L. Page, ed., The Greek Anthology: Hellenistic Epigrams (Cambridge 1965), 2.77 ad 530.

often found in passages in which, from a strictly grammatical point of view, only ἕτερος would have been correct, might well suggest the possibility of a similar usage of ἄλλος. What is more, the euphemistic usage of the adverb ἄλλως = ματαιῶς is well established³⁵), and there are several passages in which various forms of the adverb seem to be synonymous with κακῶς³⁶). With regard to the adjective, such an euphemistic usage seems to be less well recognized³⁷), yet there are in fact at least four certain examples of it³⁸):

Hes. Op. 344: εἰ γὰρ τοι καὶ χορῆμ' ἐγχώριον ἄλλο γένηται³⁹).

Demosth. 21.218: ἄλλον τινὸς ἠττησθαι.

Xen. Eph. 1.10.10: εἰ δὲ ἄλλο συμβαίη⁴⁰).

Plut. Mor. 187D: ἄν ἄλλο τι γνῶσι.

My suggestion is that ἄλλοισιν in I. 1.68 be taken as a fifth example of this euphemistic usage, and that the sentence as a whole be translated, "But if someone administers hidden wealth indoors and, if he encounters misfortune, laughs at it, then he does not consider that he will pay his soul to Hades without fame." That is, the miser feels adequately protected against life's unforeseen circumstances by the wealth he has hoarded; he thinks that he can laugh at calamities that would destroy other men, for he can always retire to the riches he has accumulated and reserved for his private use. But there is one anthropological universal he thereby

35) Cf. Etym. Mag. and Hesych. s.v. ἄλλως, LSJ s.v. ἄλλως II.3.

36) E.g., Hes. Op. 262–63 (οἱ λυγρὰ νοέοντες / ἄλλη παρκλίνωσι δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες), Strabo 1.4.4 (οἰκήσιμον ἄλλως πως: cf. Casaubon, op. cit. [n. 34], 1.111).

37) Thus, LSJ s.v. ἄλλος III.4 cite only two passages, Demosth. 21.218 and Plut. Mor. 187D. I do not know of a systematic study of this phenomenon.

38) There are also several uncertain examples. Stephanus, Thesaurus 1.1542 s.v. ἄλλος adds Hom. Il. 10.511 and Chariton 4.4 (comparing Thuc. 7.64), but both of these passages can also be interpreted non-euphemistically.

39) Cf. D. Heinsius, ed., Hesiodi Ascræi quae extant cum Graecis scholiis (Leiden 1603), ad loc.; and M. L. West, ed., Hesiod. Works and Days (Oxford 1978), 243 (comparing ἄλλοῖόν τι, Hdt. 5.40.1 and Arcesilaus *apud* Diog. Laert. 4.44; and ἕτερος, Pind. P. 3.34 and Callim. Frg. 191.63 Pf.) and 383 (adding ἄλλη Hes. Op. 262 [cf. Hom. Il. 1.120], φυσίαν ἐτέραν Aesch. Ag. 151, χεῖματος ἄλλο μῆχαρ 199).

40) Cf. P. H. Peerlkamp, ed., Xenophontis Ephesii de Anthia et Habrocome Ephesiacorum libri V (Harlemi 1818), ad loc. The most recent editor of the text, A. D. Papanikolaou (Leipzig 1973), accepts Tresling's conjectural (τι) after ἄλλο; this seems possible, but hardly necessary, and is difficult to justify palaeographically.

overlooks: the misfortune of misfortunes, death, which will come to him just as it does to everyone else and will demand from him the same payment of his soul (ψυχὰν τελέων) which it requires from all men. When that happens, the miser's hidden wealth will be of no avail, for it will not have purchased for him posthumous fame, the only bulwark of mortals against their mortality. On the other hand, Herodotus and his father, who have devoted their wealth and efforts (δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις 42) to the pursuit of publicly recognized excellence, have earned the largest profit (κέρδος ὑψιστον 51), namely renown at home and abroad. The miser is good at counting; but he did not count on this.

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EIN NEUES ARGUMENT FÜR DIE ECHTHEIT DES LYSIANISCHEN EROTIKOS

Die vieldiskutierte Frage, ob die erotische Werberede des Lysias in Platons *Phaidros*¹⁾ fingiert oder ob sie ein echter Text des berühmten Redners sei, ist vor einigen Jahren von S. Döpp²⁾ noch

1) Der Inhalt der Werberede ist nach den erhellenden Untersuchungen zur griechischen Knabenliebe von K. J. Dover (*Greek Homosexuality*, London 1978) und H. Patzer (*Die griechische Knabenliebe*, Wiesbaden 1982, SB Frankfurt/M. 19,1) erst richtig zu fassen. In ihr wird ein Paradoxon spielerisch durchgeführt, aber im Hintergrund steht ein ernsthaftes Problem, der Verfall der traditionellen Kultur der Knabenliebe in einer Zeit, die allmählich den Sinn für den Zusammenhang von Eros und Erziehung verlor. Lysias versuchte den Geist der Knabenliebe, die Elemente von φιλία und Erziehung, zu halten, den affektiven Gehalt des Eros aber zu eliminieren; dadurch blieb das sexuelle Element als sinnloses Relikt stehen. Platon machte sich den inneren Widerspruch zunutze, um das Ziel der Rede sarkastisch auf den Kopf zu stellen (237B). Er selbst hatte letzten Endes dasselbe Ziel, nämlich die alte Idee der Knabenliebe in einer veränderten geistigen und gesellschaftlichen Umwelt zu stützen und zu erneuern, doch ging er den umgekehrten Weg mit einer – nicht weniger paradoxen – Aufwertung des erotischen „Wahnsinns“.

2) S. Döpp, Der Verfasser des Erotikos in Platons ‚Phaedrus‘, Glotta 61, 1983, 15–29.